People v. Beard [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
2-24-1956
People v. Beard [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People v. Beard [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 146.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/146
278 PEOPLE v. BEARD [46 C.2d 
2 of section 836 of the Penal Code, as it appears that the 
petitioner Badillo had committed and was committing a 
felony at the time of his arrest; that the search was an in-
cident of his lawful arrest and was therefore reasonable, and 
not in violation of the constitutional guarantee against "un-
reasonable searches and seizures''; that the evidence obtained 
by such search was therefore properly admitted upon the 
preliminary hearing; and that petitioner's motion to set aside 
the information upon the ground that the evidence was ob-
tained by an alleged "unreasonable" search and seizure was 
properly denied by the trial court. 
I would therefore discharge the alternative writ of pro-
hibition and deny the peremptory writ. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied :Ylarch 21, 
1056. ShC'nk, .J., and Spence, J., \Yere of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[Crim. No. 5809. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ALFRED LEONZA BEARD, 
Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-Where no evidence is 
presented for the purpose of determining whether or not offi-
cers had reasonable cause for making an arrest and searching 
defendant's automobile, it must be presumed that the arrest 
and search were justified. 
[2] Arrest--Making Arrest.-Where the trial court found that 
defendant was arrested while engaged in commission of the 
offense charged, there was no violation of Pen. Code, § 841, 
requiring the person making an arrest to inform the person 
to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, the cause of 
his arrest and the authority to make it, except when the person 
to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or 
attempt to commit an offense. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 21 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2] 
Arrest, §13; [3] Criminal Law, §970(4). 
PEOPLE V. BEARD 
[46 C.2d 278; 294 P.2d 29] 
27<) 
Law-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.·-lt 
a husc of diseretion to deny defendant a new trial 
of newly discovered evidence where there was 
that dt~fendant's forrrwr attorney eould not have 
a potential witness subpoenaed had his t(estimony been 
ted ;Jt the tri11l and no ~lwwing: why another witness, who 
near the scene of the arrest, could not be located and 
uu•:u<Lcu or why the same investigation to locate her after 
trial would not have succeeded had r<"asonable diligence 
]j,,en used earlier, and where neither def<'ndant's nor his new 
affidavit stated facts indicating that failure to 
dbtain the evidence presented was owing to any lack of dili-
of the former attorney. 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
County and from an order denying a new trial. 
L. Ambrose, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment 
of conviction affirmed. 
H. J.1e>vis and E. V. Cavanaugh for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James, 
:Marvin Gross and Joan D. Gross, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Respondent. 
'i' RAYNO I{, ,J.-By information defendant was charged 
\rirlJ one count of possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 1 , and one prior misdemeanor conviction of the same 
offense. .1\. jury trial 1vas waived, and by stipulation the 
's case was submitted on the transcript of the 
iminary hearing. Defendant trstified in his own behalf. 
Ht• was found gnilty and sentenced to the state prison for 
tlw term prescribed by law. He appeals from the judgment 
and from the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
Officer Buckner of the r,os Angeles Police Department 
trstified that shortly after noon on September 17, HJ54, he 
another officrr were dri \'ing north on l\Iaple A venue when 
observed defendant and a friend of his named Fortier 
west on 29th Street. Defendant was driYing. The 
offieers overshot 29th Street, 1vent around the block and 
came baek on 29th Street approaching Maple Avenue from 
the: west. 'rhey obserYed defendant's car parked ahead of 
ib,·m. Defendant and Fortier thrn started driving down the 
sheet to1yard the officers' car, [mel when they had gone about 
[46 C.2d 
side the front seat, and 
found in one of defendant's 
accused the officers of "planting 
the area near the place 
and inside a fence 
in wax paper.* 
for Fortier at his home 
'''"nmr•nn by the officers. He 
so that Fortier could buy 
the corner, and defendant also got out of the 
He did not see the officers find a 
his car, and neither of them showed him the 
Officer Buckner testified >vas found in the car, 
not know that there was any marijuana cigarette 
in his car. He worked as a janitor and had left his car open 





was found defendant secured new counsel 
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
§ 1181, subd. ( 8).) He presented 
Fortier and a person who lived near the scene 
and each affiant stated that he had observed 
of the car and that neither officer had found a 
in the car. He also filed an affidavit in 
that he was personally unable to secure 
the evidence before the trial because he was in custody. His 
new counsel filed an affidavit stating that he had no knowledge 
as to defendant's witnesses were not produced at his trial. 
Defendant contends that the officers did not have rea-
sonable cause to believe that he had committed a felony and 
that therefore his arrest and the search of his automobile 
This case was tried before the decision in People 
44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], no evidence was 
for the purpose of determining whether or not 
officers had reasonab1e cause for making an arrest, and 
silent on this question. In People v. 
265 [294 P.2d 21], we held that under 
it must be presumed that the arrest was 
*The committing magistrate refused to admit these cigarettes in 
evidence on the ground that they had not been sufficiently connected with 
and the trial eourt stated that he did not consider the testi· 
officer concerning them in finding defendant guilty. 
281 
verdict has been rendered 
the court may, 
in the following cases 
new t~vidence is discovered the de-
could with rcnsonab1c 
at the triaL . " 
42 Cal.2d 4it2 
ont that a motion for a new 
sound discretion of the trial :md t1mt "The 
of the standard by which trinl court m its dis-
may properly grant a new trial on the of 
discovered evidence are set forth in 
243 [15 P. . At page 2'17 it is stated that 'it must 
'L That the and not 
be newly discovere\1; 2. 'l'hat thr 
8. That it be sueh to 
at the trial ; and 5. 
rviclencP ;Ylli('h Hw 
aml 
of one or more of llle 
c•r.-alJ rn ]c;.; 1mn' wi 1 h:·d ood the test 
282 PEOPLE v. BEARD [46 C.2d 
state the existing law. (See People v. Richard, 101 Cal.App. 
2d 631,635-636 [225 P.2d 938].)" (42 Cal.2d at 433.) 
[3] In the light of the foregoing rules it cannot be said 
that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Thus, 
Fortier was present in defendant's car at the time of the 
arrest and search and was also charged with a violation of 
Health and Safety Code, section 11500, which charge was 
dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Obviously defendant 
was aware that Fortier was a potential witness, and it is not 
claimed that his former attorney could not have had him 
subpoenaed had his testimony been wanted at the trial. 
Similarly there is no showing as to why the other witness 
could not be located and subpoenaed. She lived near the 
scene of the arrest, and the trial court could reasonably infer 
from the fact that she was close enough to observe the search, 
that defendant was aware of her presence at the time. Al-
though, while he was in custody, defendant could not per-
sonally locate this witness, there is no showing why the same 
investigation made to locate her after the trial would not 
have succeeded had reasonable diligence been used earlier. 
Moreover, although defendant now contends that he should 
not be penalized for any lack of diligence on the part of 
his former attorney, neither his nor his present attorney's 
affidavit states facts indicating that the failure to obtain the 
evidence now presented was owing to any lack of diligence 
of the former attorney. Defendant does not state that he 
informed his former attorney that bystanders witnessed the 
search, that he requested that she attempt to locate such 
witnesses, or that she refused to make any attempt to secure 
witnesses in his behalf. Under these circumstances the trial 
court could reasonably conclude that defendant had not shown 
that the decision to rely solely on his own testimony was 
other than his own, or that the evidence now presented was 
evidence "which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial.'' (Pen. Code, § 1181, 
subd. (8).) 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, C .• J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
Shenk, J., concnrred in the judgment. 
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent. 
Since the fads of this case with respect to the reasonable-




l!J3f1 I P~:OPI.~; V. BEARD 
14G C.2d 278; 2~14 P.2d 291 
\ .1/rtrlin. ( 'rin1. ;)/;)/'\. 1/Jifr, p. ]()!; I 2~):{ 
to my dis:;rni". in t ltai ,·asP as :w ex 
011 ihe Jaw applic·able j(J ihe ease al h<ll'. 
J'.~d :-1:2]. 
of' my 
i'llere is anotiH'r rensmt wl1y l mmld n•,·pr:-;r~ ihe judglllcnt 
1·asro at bat· \\llir·h is not llll'lllioln•d in my dis:-;ent in 
artiu ease, snpm. c\s pointed cmr in the opinion 
the ease at bar. thi;;. ease \ras tried before the deeision 
:his eourt in People Y. 44 Cal.~d 434 P.2d 
. aml therefme tl11• trial eourt (1id not Jwye before it 
iakc into consiclel'ation the rule annomwed in the Cahan 
·with respect to the admissibility of illegally obtained 
lenee. Neither did the trial ('OUrt haye or:casion to pass 
np"n the reaso11ablcness of the seareh and seizure as this 
fador was not considered material nncler the rule and prae-
\rhidl existed prior t n i he dec·ision of this eourt in the 
(';ll:un ease. For this reason \re do not haye the benefit of 
1l1(' finding- of the trial eonrt on the question of whether or 
1101 he officers vdlO eondneted the sc"arch here had reasonable 
c·auc;e to believe that clefeuchmt hall eommitted a felony or 
,, <h r·Jlgaged in the eommission of a felony at the time of 
1 ile seareh. \Vhile it is my opinion, that on the reeonl before 
11s. 110 reasonable canse is shmYn for the seareh of the de-
lhlllant, and it must therefore be declared to be an illegal 
it may be that if the ease agaim:t the defendant was 
proseentL~d in the light of ·what ·was said by this eourt 
Jl! the Cahan case and rases whieh have followed that ease, 
thr proseeution wonld no doubt offer any eYidenee available 
fnr the purpose of showing the reasonableness of the seareh 
<11:'1 the trial court \Yonld necessarily make a finding on this 
i~:,\te in ruling 011 the mlmissibility of the eYiclenr:e obtained 
the result of the seardl. If there \Yas a eonflict in the 
cYidenee on this issue, 1n~ 1Yonl1l be honnd by the finding 
o!' ilte trial eonrt the same as we should be bonncl by sueh a 
finding in any other ease. 
I ean see no jnstifieation whatsoen·r for tl1e holding of 
majority in this <·ase that the eYi1lence as a matter of 
shmYs that the offieers had reasonable grounds to believe 
defendant hacl committe([ or \\·as engaged in the com-
Hlission of a felony at the time they made the seal'eh and 
~~'lZllre here inYolYed, but on the contrary it appears from 
face of the record that the only condusion that can be 
rl:·awn is that the officers had no eause whateYrr to believe 
defr•Jvlant llad eommitted or \YHR engaged in the eommission 
No. 5779. In Bank. ]'eb. 1956.] 
v. ANTHONY CITRINO, 
Criminal Law- Appeal 
criminal case was tried before Court's decision 
trial. 
44 Cal.2d 282 P.2d 905, defendant 
from raising on appeal the question that 
obtained evidence was admitted against him though 
not to the admissibility of the evidence at the 
[2] Searches and the record is 
premises and defend-
ant's automobile had a search warrant and there is no evi-
dence illegality of the search, it must be presumed 
that the officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties. 
Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 15, 33.) 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Where 
could have testified to the of a conditional 
sales contract without removing it the house that was 
searched and thus could have shown defendant's ownership 
of the automobile in question, he was not prejudiced by 
admission of the contract in evidence. 
Searches and 
§ 6 et seq. 
§ 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
References: [1] Criminal § 1079; [2] Searches 
and § 1 Criminal Law, § 1382; [ 4] Criminal Law, 
§ 393(2); Burglary, 25, 26; [6-8] Burglary, § 40; [9] Wit-
nesses, § 135(4); [10] Criminal Law, § 1377(1); [11] Criminal 
Law,§ 589; [12] Criminal Law,§ 1407(9). 
